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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES from a comparative perspective the
rules of evidence relating to relevance and its limits. The Article com-
pares the approaches of the California Evidence Code ("Code") and
the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rules") to challenges to the introduc-
tion of evidence on the grounds of irrelevance or on the basis of limits
placed on the introduction of relevant evidence. Where pertinent,
this Article also considers the approach of the 1999 version of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence ("Uniform Rules").
* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford University.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
I prepared this Article in response to a study that the California
Law Revision Commission ("Commission") authorized to assess
whether the Code should be conformed to the Rules. The California
Legislature created the Commission in 1953 as the permanent succes-
sor to the Code Commission.' Its chief responsibility is to review Cali-
fornia statutory and decisional law to discover defects and
anachronisms and to recommend legislation to make needed reforms.
This Article is the seventh in the series and was submitted to the
Commission on December 1, 2006.2 The California and federal provi-
sions compared were in effect as of December 2006. To assist the
reader, the pertinent Rules and Code sections, respectively, are repro-
duced at the beginning of each section of this Article. They are fol-
lowed by a Comparative Note in which the Code sections are
compared with the Federal Rules.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in
this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or
reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the
Commission.
1.00 Relevance in General
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
1. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, http://www.clirc.ca.gov/Mbg-history.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2007).
2. See generally Miguel Mendhz, V7. Authentication and the Best and Secondary Evidence
Rules, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2006); Miguel Mend6z, V. Witnesses: Conforming the California
Evidence Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 455 (2005); Miguel Mend~z,
Presumptions and Burden of Proof: Conforming the California Evidence Code to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 139 (2003); Miguel Mend6z, III. The Role of Judge and Jury: Con-
forming the Evidence Code to the Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Miguel Mend~z,
II. Expert Testimony and the Opinion Rule: Conforming the Evidence Code to the Federal Rules, 37
U.S.F. L. REv. 411 (2003); Miguel Mend&z, I. Hearsay and Its Exceptions: Conforming the Evi-
dence Code to the Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 351 (2003).
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rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON
GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF
TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
§ 210. Relevant evidence
"Relevant evidence" means evidence, including evidence relevant
to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any ten-
dency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action.
§ 350. Only relevant evidence admissible
No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.
§ 351. Admissibility of relevant evidence
Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible.
§ 352. Discretion of court to exclude evidence
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substan-
tial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of mislead-
ing the jury.
Comparative Note. These Rules and Code sections set out the fun-
damental condition that all evidence must satisfy if it is to be admit-
ted: no evidence is admissible unless it is relevant.3 The provisions
then postulate the basic rule of admissibility: unless otherwise pro-
3. FED. R. EVID. 402; CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1995).
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vided, all relevant evidence is admissible. 4 Most of the Rules and Code
sections that follow impose some kind of limitation on the use of rele-
vant evidence.
There is no substantive difference between the federal and Cali-
fornia definitions of relevant evidence. Rule 401,5 unlike Code section
210,6 does not expressly refer to the credibility of witnesses in its defi-
nition, 7 but the omission is immaterial. Since the fact-finders will ulti-
mately determine which witnesses to believe or disbelieve, evidence
bearing on the credibility of witnesses is obviously of consequence to
the determination of the action being tried.
Rule 401 makes clearer than Code section 210 the burden the
proponent must discharge when confronted by an irrelevance objec-
tion. The proponent need only convince the judge that the proffered
evidence makes the existence of any consequential fact more or less
probable than the fact would be without the evidence.8 Though both
provisions impose the same burden on the proponent of the evi-
dence, the language of Rule 401 is superior in this respect. Accord-
ingly, California should consider adopting Rule 401's language
regarding how a judge should measure the probative value of the
proffered evidence.
Neither the Code nor the Rules establishes a preference between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Section 410 of the Code defines
direct evidence as "evidence that directly proves a fact, without an in-
ference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, conclusively estab-
lishes that fact."9 This section, however, does not favor direct evidence
over circumstantial evidence. There is no analogous Rule. From a rel-
evance perspective, the distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence is without significance. Either can satisfy the tests of material-
ity and probative value, and both are generally acceptable means of
proof in civil and criminal matters. 10 California should retain section
410.
Neither the Rules nor the Code requires a judge to admit all rele-
vant evidence that is otherwise admissible. Rule 403 and Code section
352 embody the principle that ajudge may exclude otherwise admissi-
4. FED. R. EVID. 402; CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.
5. FED. R. EVID. 401.
6. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210.
7. Compare FED. R. EVID. 401, with CAL. EVID. CODE § 210.
8. FED. R. EVID. 401.
9. CAL. EVID. CODE § 410.
10. See MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH § 2.06, at 33 (3d ed. 2004).
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ble evidence if its probative value on contested issues is substantially
outweighed by enumerated concerns." These include the dangers
that the evidence might prejudice a party unduly, confuse the issues
to be decided, mislead the jury, or consume too much time.' 2 A key
feature is that the rule does not come into play at all if another rule
excludes the evidence. Only if the evidence is otherwise admissible
may the objecting party appeal to the judge's discretion as a last
resort.
There is no substantive difference between Rule 403 and Code
section 352. Both emphasize that judges should not use their discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence unless its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by a countervailing factor. 13
1.01 Character Evidence in General
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO
PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's charac-
ter or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. In a criminal case, evidence of a perti-
nent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Rule
404(a) (2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused of-
fered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. In a criminal case, and subject to
the limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
11. FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
12. FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
13. FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
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order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to intro-
duce at trial.
RULE 405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of char-
acter or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant spe-
cific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or
a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that
person's conduct.
RULE 412. SEX OFFENSE CASES; RELEVANCE OF ALLEGED
VICTIM'S PAST SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OR ALLEGED
SEXUAL PREDISPOSITION
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if oth-
erwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the al-
leged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was
the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the al-
leged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual miscon-
duct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution;
and
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(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is oth-
erwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substan-
tially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair
prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is
admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged
victim.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered
unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim
or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting the evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right
to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of
the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court
orders otherwise.
§ 1100. Manner of proof of character
Except as otherwise provided by statute, any otherwise admissible
evidence (including evidence in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, and evidence of specific instances of such person's con-
duct) is admissible to prove a person's character or a trait of his
character.
§ 1101. Evidence of character to prove conduct
(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103,
1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or
her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputa-
tion, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inad-
missible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasion.
Fall 20071 RELEVANCE
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(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence
that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when rele-
vant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or
whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or
attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith
believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to
commit such an act.
(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence
offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.
§ 1102. Opinion and reputation evidence of character of criminal
defendant to prove conduct
In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant's character or a
trait of his character in the form of an opinion or evidence of his
reputation is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if such evidence
is:
(a) Offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in conformity
with such character or trait of character.
(b) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the
defendant under subdivision (a).
§ 1103. Character evidence of crime victim to prove conduct;
evidence of defendant's character or trait for violence;
evidence of manner of dress of victim; evidence of
complaining witness' sexual conduct
(a) In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of
character (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for
which the defendant is being prosecuted is not made inadmissible by
Section 1101 if the evidence is:
(1) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in
conformity with the character or trait of character.
(2) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the
defendant under paragraph (1).
(b) In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant's character
for violence or trait of character for violence (in the form of an opin-
ion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of con-
duct) is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is
offered by the prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in con-
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formity with the character or trait of character and is offered after
evidence that the victim had a character for violence or a trait of char-
acter tending to show violence has been adduced by the defendant
under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).
(c) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the
contrary, and except as provided in this subdivision, in any prosecu-
tion under Section 261, 262 or 264.1 of the Penal Code, or under
Section 286, 288a, or 289 of the Penal Code, or for assault with intent
to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit a crime de-
fined in any of those sections, except where the crime is alleged to
have occurred in a local detention facility, as defined in Section
6031.4, or in a state prison, as defined in Section 4504, opinion evi-
dence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the
complaining witness' sexual conduct, or any of that evidence, is not
admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by the com-
plaining witness.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), evidence of the manner in
which the victim was dressed at the time of the commission of the
offense shall not be admissible when offered by either party on the
issue of consent in any prosecution for an offense specified in para-
graph (1), unless the evidence is determined by the court to be rele-
vant and admissible in the interests of justice. The proponent of the
evidence shall make an offer of proof outside the hearing of the jury.
The court shall then make its determination and at that time, state the
reasons for its ruling on the record. For the purposes of this para-
graph, "manner of dress" does not include the condition of the vic-
tim's clothing before, during, or after the commission of the offense.
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not be applicable to evidence of the com-
plaining witness' sexual conduct with the defendant.
(4) If the prosecutor introduces evidence, including testimony of
a witness, or the complaining witness as a witness gives testimony, and
that evidence or testimony relates to the complaining witness' sexual
conduct, the defendant may cross-examine the witness who gives the
testimony and offer relevant evidence limited specifically to the rebut-
tal of the evidence introduced by the prosecutor or given by the com-
plaining witness.
(5) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to make inad-
missible any evidence offered to attack the credibility of the com-
plaining witness as provided in Section 782.
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(6) As used in this section, "complaining witness" means the al-
leged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject
to this subdivision.
§ 1104. Character trait for care or skill
Except as provided in Sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a trait
of a person's character with respect to care or skill is inadmissible to
prove the quality of his conduct on a specified occasion.
§ 1106. Sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery cases;
opinion or reputation evidence of plaintiff's sexual conduct;
inadmissibility; exception; cross-examination
(a) In any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual
harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, opinion evidence, repu-
tation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of plaintiff's sexual
conduct, or any of such evidence, is not admissible by the defendant
in order to prove consent by the plaintiff or the absence of injury to
the plaintiff, unless the injury alleged by the plaintiff is in the nature
of loss of consortium.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not be applicable to evidence of the
plaintiffs sexual conduct with the alleged perpetrator.
(c) If the plaintiff introduces evidence, including testimony of a
witness, or the plaintiff as a witness gives testimony, and the evidence
or testimony relates to the plaintiffs sexual conduct, the defendant
may cross-examine the witness who gives the testimony and offer rele-
vant evidence limited specifically to the rebuttal of the evidence intro-
duced by the plaintiff or given by the plaintiff.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to make inadmissi-
ble any evidence offered to attack the credibility of the plaintiff as
provided in Section 783.
Comparative Note.
General Rule of Exclusion. Rule 404(a) and Code section I101 (a)
introduce the general principle that evidence of an individual's char-
acter is inadmissible as proof that the individual conformed his or her
conduct on a given occasion with his or her character. 14 Accordingly,
in a civil action for making a false representation, evidence that the
defendant made false representations on other occasions would be
inadmissible if offered to prove that the defendant made the false rep-
14. FED. R. EVID. 404(a); CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
resentation in question because he or she is the kind of person who
makes such representations.
Character evidence is not excluded because it is irrelevant. Under
the federal and California definitions of relevance, 15 the evidence is
relevant. Rather, the evidence is excluded on public policy grounds.
First, the admission of character evidence and its counter evidence
might consume too much time and too many judicial resources. ' 6 Sec-
ond, jurors might overestimate the value of evidence of other miscon-
duct. Jurors might jump to the unwarranted conclusion that a party is
guilty of the misconduct charged if they learn that on other occasions
the party engaged in similar misdeeds.' 7 Third, in criminal cases, ju-
rors might be tempted to return a guilty verdict that is based on the
accused's "bad" character rather than on the commission of a punish-
able act. Having heard that the accused committed misdeeds similar
to the crime charged,jurors might conclude that the accused ought to
be incarcerated because he or she is a bad person. The jurors might
find that the accused is deserving of removal from society even if they
are not convinced that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.' 8 In
our system of criminal justice, individuals should be convicted for
what they do, not for who they are. 19 Although no comparable con-
cern applies in civil matters, the ban on the use of character evidence
to prove conduct on a given occasion applies to civil cases as well. 2
0
The Mercy Rule Exception-Character of the Accused. Because life and
liberty are at stake in a criminal case, Rule 404(a) (1) and Code sec-
tion 1102 adopt the common law mercy rule allowing the accused to
offer evidence of a good character trait as proof that he or she is not
the kind of person who would commit the offense charged. 2' If the
accused makes use of this exception, then the prosecution is allowed
to rebut with evidence of the accused's bad character. 22 Under Rule
405(a) and Code section 1102, both the accused and the prosecution
are limited to opinion and reputation evidence in proving the desired
character trait.23
15. FED. R. EVID. 401; CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1995).
16. See MENDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.04, at 48.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. As amended in 2006, Federal Rule of Evidence 404 makes clear that character
evidence is not admissible in civil cases to prove conduct in conformity therewith. FED. R.
EVID. 404 advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
21. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102 (West 1995).
22. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102.
23. FED. R. EvID. 405(a); CAL. EvIo. CODE § 1102.
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The Mercy Rule Exception-Character of the Crime Victim. Rule
404(a)(2) and Code section 1103(a) also allow the accused to offer
evidence of a crime victim's character trait as proof of the victim's
conduct on a given occasion if, under the substantive criminal law, the
victim's conduct exculpates or mitigates the accused's misconduct.24
In an assault prosecution, for example, these provisions would allow
the accused to offer bad character evidence of the victim's predisposi-
tion to engage in unprovoked attacks as proof that the victim was the
first aggressor on the occasion in question. If the accused makes use
of this exception, then the prosecution is allowed to rebut with evi-
dence of the victim's good character. 25
Under Rule 405(a), the accused and the prosecution are limited
to offering only opinion and reputation evidence in proving the vic-
tim's character trait.26 But under the Code, the accused and the prose-
cution may, in addition, offer specific instances of the victim's
conduct to prove the desired character trait.2 7 This departs from the
traditional common law rule which limited proof of the desired char-
acter trait to reputation or opinion evidence. 28
Under Rule 404(a) (1), if the accused offers evidence of the vic-
tim's bad character, the prosecution may, in addition, offer evidence
of the same character trait of the accused. 29 Thus, if the accused im-
pugns the victim's character for peacefulness, the prosecution may
not only rebut with evidence of the victim's good character for peace-
fulness but may also offer evidence of the accused's bad character for
aggressiveness. This is true even if the accused refrained from offering
evidence of his or her good character in his or her case-in-chief. Rule
404(a) (1) departs from the traditional common law rule which re-
quired the accused to place his or her character at issue before the
prosecution was allowed to offer evidence of the accused's bad
character.3 0
Code section 1103(b) is similar to Rule 404(a) (1) but is limited
to the character trait for violence. 3' If the accused offers evidence of
the victim's predisposition to engage in unprovoked attacks, the pros-
ecution may, in addition, offer evidence of the accused's character for
24. SeeFED. R. EVID. 404(a) (2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
25. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a)(2).
26. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
29. Id. at 404(a) (1).
30. See id. at 405 advisory committee's note.
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b).
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violence to prove that he was the first aggressor on the occasion in
question.12 Under the California provision, the prosecution is not lim-
ited to offering opinion or reputation evidence. It may also offer evi-
dence of specific instances of violence by the accused to establish the
pertinent character trait.33 Because Code section 1103 (b) includes evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct, it departs from the traditional
common law rule. Code section 1103(b) also departs from the com-
mon law rule because it allows the prosecution to offer bad character
evidence about the accused even though the accused may not have
placed his character at issue.
Under Rule 404(a) (2), the prosecution may, in a homicide prose-
cution, offer evidence of the victim's trait of peacefulness even if the
accused did not first offer evidence of the victim's predisposition to
engage in unprovoked attacks. So long as the accused offers evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor on the occasion in question, the
prosecution may offer evidence of the victim's trait of peacefulness in
the form of opinion and reputation evidence. Since by definition the
victim is dead in a homicide prosecution and cannot provide his or
her version of what transpired during. the homicidal attack, necessity
is the justification for Rule 404(a) (2). 34 The Rule applies, however,
even if other eyewitnesses testify to the fatal attack. Moreover, the
Rule does not expressly require the intended victim to be the person
who dies. Accordingly, if the accused misses the victim and inadver-
tently kills someone else, the accused could still be tried for a homi-
cide (e.g., murder) under the doctrine of transferred intent.3 5 The
intended victim, having survived, could still testify and rebut any evi-
dence by the accused that he was merely acting in self-defense.
The Code does not contain a similar provision. If one is enacted,
it should be limited to those homicide prosecutions in which the vic-
tim is the deceased and there are no surviving eyewitnesses other than
the accused.
Proof of Other Purposes. Rule 404(b) and Code section 1101(b)
make explicit what is implied in the rules prohibiting the use of char-
acter evidence to prove conduct on a specified occasion. If the evi-
dence is offered to prove some relevant proposition-other than a
person's predisposition to engage in particular conduct-then the evi-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (2) advisory committee's note; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 193, at 572-73 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (a), (3)(a) (2001).
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dence is admissible unless banned by some other rule. 36 Both provi-
sions provide similar, though not identical, non-exclusive lists of
permissible propositions.37 Rule 404(b) differs from the Code in that
it requires the prosecution in a criminal case to provide notice in ad-
vance of trial of its intention to offer evidence under the Rule.38 Pre-
trial notice is included "to reduce surprise and promote early
resolution on the issue of admissibility."
39
The Uniform Rules go further. Uniform Rule 404 provides for
pretrial notice in all cases, not just prosecutions. 40 In addition, if the
evidence is offered against the accused, Uniform Rule 404(c) (2) re-
quires the court to conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of
the evidence. 41 The court must exclude the evidence unless the pro-
ponent convinces the judge by clear and convincing evidence that the
misdeed attributed to the accused was committed and that its proba-
tive value on contested issues outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice. 42 The risk of unfair prejudice is highest when the prosecu-
tion offers evidence of other misdeeds that are identical or similar to
the misdeed for which the accused is on trial.43 In these circum-
stances, jurors might find it especially difficult to abide by an instruc-
tion limiting their consideration of the evidence only to the
admissible purpose for which it is offered. They might find treating
the evidence as bad character evidence irresistible. Because evidence
offered under Rule 404(b) and Code section 1101(b) can be espe-
cially prejudicial to the accused, California should consider adopting
36. FED. R. EVIn. 404(b); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101(b).
37. FED. R. EviD. 404(b) (listing "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident"); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (b)
(listing "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or
attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim
consented").
38. FED. R. Ev. 404(b).
39. Id. at advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment).
40. UNIF. R. EVID. 404(c) (1) & comment. "Evidence is not admissible ... unless: (1)
the proponent gives to all adverse parties reasonable notice in advance of trial ..... Id. at
404(c) (1).
41. Id. at 404(c) (2). "Evidence is not admissible ... unless ... if offered in a criminal
case, the court conducts a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence" and
makes certain findings. Id.
42. Id.
43. See MtNDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.15, at 91 n.102.
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the pretrial notice of the federal provision as well as the additional
safeguards of the-Uniform Rules.44
Character as an Element of the Cause of Action. Whenever a character
trait is an element of a criminal or civil cause of action, Rule 405(b)
and Code section 1101 allow the use of relevant evidence to prove the
trait.45 In a defamation action, for example, a defendant is entitled to
offer evidence that the plaintiff engaged in dishonest conduct in or-
der to prove that the plaintiff is a liar. The plaintiffs claim that the
defendant defamed him or her by calling him or her a liar makes the
existence of his or her trait for veracity an element of the cause of
action. Although they do not use identical language, both provisions
accomplish the same end.
Character for Care and Skill. Except as provided in Code sections
1102 and 1103, Code section 1104 bans the use of evidence of a trait
of a person's character with respect to care or skill to prove the quality
of his or her conduct on a specified occasion.46 Code sections 1102
and 1103 refer to the mercy rules previously discussed in Part 1.01.
4 7
The Rules do not have a counterpart. However, such a provision is
unnecessary. The federal prohibition on the use of character evidence
to prove conduct on a given occasion is sufficiently broad to exclude
this kind of evidence.
The California provision is a specific application of the general
prohibition on the use of character evidence. Its value is putting the
parties and the court on notice that the prohibition applies to traits of
care and skill as well, especially in personal injury cases. Accordingly,
Code section 1104 should be retained.
Rape Shield Provisions. In the absence of special provisions, the
rules allowing the accused to offer evidence of the victim's character
to prove conduct in conformity with that character would pose serious
problems in sexual assault prosecutions. If ajury believes that the vic-
tim consented to the sexual contact charged against the accused, then
under the substantive criminal law of most jurisdictions they would
have to acquit.48 Prior to the adoption of the rape shield laws, the
accused in California was free to offer evidence of the victim's sexual
44. The Advisory Committee notes that the "overwhelming number" of reported cases
involve the introduction of other crimes evidence by the prosecution. See FED. R. EVID. 404
advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment).
45. FED. R. EVID. 405(b); see CAL. EvmD. CODE § 1101 (b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
46. CAL. EvD. CODE § 1104 (West 1995).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 21-35.
48. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (a) (West 1999). The victim, however, must have
the legal capacity to consent. Id.
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conduct with others to prove the victim's predisposition to consent to
sexual contact, including on the occasion charged against the ac-
cused.49 Concern that the use of sexual history would deter victims
from testifying gave rise to the rape shield laws. 50
Rule 412, the federal rape shield law, generally bars the use of a
victim's sexual behavior or predisposition in cases involving sexual
misconduct, whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeach-
ment.5 ' The prohibition is to be read broadly, and according to the
Advisory Committee Note, should exclude such evidence as the vic-
tim's mode of dress, speech, and lifestyle. 52 Rule 412, not Rule 404,
governs the use of character evidence to prove consent in sexual mis-
conduct prosecutions. 53 Rule 412 permits the accused to offer evi-
dence of specific instances of his own sexual conduct with the victim
to prove consent 54 unless the judge concludes that the probative value
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial concerns
enumerated in Rule 403. 5 5 In proving consent, the accused is not lim-
ited to prior instances of sexual activity between the victim and the
accused. The Advisory Committee Note emphasizes that the accused
may also offer other evidence that is probative of the victim's predis-
position to engage in consensual activities with the accused, including
statements in which the victim expressed an interest in engaging in
sexual activities with the accused or voiced sexual fantasies involving
the accused. 56 Rule 412 allows the accused to offer evidence of spe-
cific instances of the victim's sexual conduct with others only to prove
that someone other than the accused is responsible for the assault
charged. 57
A 1994 amendment clarifies that Rule 412's rape shield law also
applies in civil cases involving sexual misconduct, such as sexual har-
assment claims. 58 Rather than spell out the limited purposes for which
evidence of a victim's sexual behavior or predisposition can be re-
ceived in civil cases, Rule 412 commits the admissibility of the evi-
dence to the court's discretion. 59 If the evidence is otherwise
49. MtNDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.12, at 64.
50. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment).
51. FED. R. Evo. 412(a) advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment).
52. Id. at advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment).
53. Id. at412(b)(1)(B).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 412(c), 403.
56. Id. at 412 advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment).
57. Id. at412(b)(1)(A).
58. Id. at 412(b) (2) advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment).
59. See id. at 412(b)(2).
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admissible under the Rules, it may be received if the court finds that
its probative value on contested issues substantially outweighs the dan-
ger of harm to the victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. 60 This
weighing formula, and not the one in Rule 403, governs the use of
Rule 412 evidence in a civil case.
Whether offered in a civil or criminal case, the judge, before ad-
mitting evidence under Rule 412, must hold an in camera hearing at
which the alleged victim and all parties are entitled to be heard.61 The
proponent must file a motion at least fourteen days before the trial
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is of-
fered, unless the judge, for good cause, requires a different time or
permits the motion to be filed during the trial.62
Code section 1103(c) is California's rape shield provision. Prior
to its enactment, the accused could rely on Code section 1103(a) (1)
to offer evidence of the victim's relations with him or her as well as
with others to prove the victim's predisposition to consent on the oc-
casion being tried.63 Now, Code section 1103(c) (3) limits the accused
to evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with him or her.64 The ac-
cused may not offer evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with
others unless the prosecution introduces evidence or the complaining
witness gives testimony relating to the complaining witness' sexual
conduct. 65 If that occurs, the accused may offer evidence limited spe-
cifically to rebutting the evidence introduced by the prosecution or
given by the complaining witness.66
Although Code section 1103(c) (3) preserves the right of the ac-
cused to offer instances of the victim's sexual conduct with the ac-
cused to prove the victim's consent to the act in question, that right is
not limitless. To begin with, a judge may exclude the evidence of the
past relations if the judge concludes under Code section 352 that its
probative value on the issue of consent is outweighed by its prejudicial
effects. 67 Also, in proving the victim's consent on the occasion in ques-
tion, the accused may not offer evidence of the manner in which the
60. Id.
61. Id. at 412(c) (2).
62. Id. at 412(c)(1). The motion must be written and served on all other parties. Id.
63. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
64. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(3).
65. Id. § 1103(c) (4).
66. Id.
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995). Section 1103(c) (3) is not exempted from the
operation of section 352.
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victim was dressed.68 That evidence is admissible only if, after a hear-
ing outside the presence of the jury, the judge determines that it is
relevant and should be admitted in the interests of justice. 69
Like Rule 412(b) (2), Code section 1106 places limits on the ad-
missibility of the victim's sexual conduct with others in civil actions
involving sexual harassment, battery, or assault.70 Rule 412(b)(2),
however, generally commits the admissibility of the evidence to the
court's discretion. 7' Section 1106, in contrast, expressly prohibits the
use of the victim's sexual conduct with others to prove consent unless
the injury alleged by the plaintiff involves loss of consortium. 72
Both the federal and California rape shield laws have been
amended extensively. 73 Their amendments reflect the difficulties each
jurisdiction has faced in achieving an appropriate balance between
the rights of sexual assault victims and those of the accused. California
should retain its provisions.
1.02 New Exceptions to the Ban on the Use of Character
Evidence
RULE 413. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR CRIMES IN SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence
under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose the
evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a sum-
mary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered,
at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later
time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or con-
sideration of evidence under any other rule.
68. Id. § 1103(c) (2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1106 (West 1995).
71. FED. R. EvID. 412(b) (2).
72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106.
73. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (1994 Amendment); CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1103 hist. n. (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
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(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual
assault" means a crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as
defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United
States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's
body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the
defendant and any part of another person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of
death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in
paragraphs (1)-(4).
RULE 414. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR CRIMES IN CHILD
MOLESTATION CASES
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence
under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose the
evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a sum-
mary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered,
at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later
time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or con-
sideration of evidence under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "child" means a per-
son below the age of fourteen, and "offense of child molestation"
means a crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in
section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United
States Code, that was committed in relation to a child;
(2) any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United
States Code;
(3) contact between any part of the defendant's body or an object
and the genitals or anus of a child;
(4) contact between the genitals or anus of the defendant and
any part of the body of a child;
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(5) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of
death, bodily injury, or physical pain on a child; or
(6) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in
paragraphs (1)-(5).
RULE 415. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACTS IN CIVIL CASES
CONCERNING SEXUAL ASSAULT OR CHILD
MOLESTATION
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an
offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule
413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall
disclose the evidence to the party against whom it will be offered, in-
cluding statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before
the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow
for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or con-
sideration of evidence under any other rule.
§ 1108. Evidence of another sexual offense by defendant;
disclosure; construction of section
(a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a
sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if
the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, in-
cluding statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered in compliance with the provi-
sions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission or
consideration of evidence under any other section of this code.
(d) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) "Sexual offense" means a crime under the law of a state or of
the United States that involved any of the following:
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(A) Any conduct proscribed by Section 243.4, 261, 261.5, 262,
264.1, 266c, 269, 286, 288, 288a, 288.2, 288.5, or 289, or subdivision
(b), (c), or (d) of Section 311.2 or Section 311.3, 311.4, 311.10,
311.11, 314, or 647.6, of the Penal Code.
(B) Any conduct proscribed by Section 220 of the Penal Code,
except assault with intent to commit mayhem.
(C) Contact, without consent, between any part of the defen-
dant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person.
(D) Contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the
defendant and any part of another person's body.
(E) Deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction
of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person.
(F) An attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in
this paragraph.
(2) "Consent" shall have the same meaning as provided in Sec-
tion 261.6 of the Penal Code, except that it does not include consent
which is legally ineffective because of the age, mental disorder, or de-
velopmental or physical disability of the victim.
§ 1109. Evidence of defendant's other acts of domestic violence
(a) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving do-
mestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other do-
mestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the
evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
(2) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving abuse
of an elder or dependent person, evidence of the defendant's com-
mission of other abuse of an elder or dependent person is not made
inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursu-
ant to Section 352.
(3) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f) and subject to a
hearing conducted pursuant to Section 352, which shall include con-
sideration of any corroboration and remoteness in time, in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving child
abuse, evidence of the defendant's commission of child abuse is not
made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible
pursuant to Section 352. Nothing in this paragraph prohibits or limits
the admission of evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1101.
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(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, in-
cluding statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance with the provi-
sions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the
admission or consideration of evidence under any other statute or
case law.
(d) As used in this section:
(1) "Abuse of an elder or dependent person" means physical or
sexual abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduc-
tion, or other treatment that results in physical harm, pain, or mental
suffering, the deprivation of care by a caregiver, or other deprivation
by a custodian or provider of goods or services that are necessary to
avoid physical harm or mental suffering.
(2) "Child abuse" means an act proscribed by Section 273d of the
Penal Code.
(3) "Domestic violence" has the meaning set forth in Section
13700 of the Penal Code. Subject to a hearing conducted pursuant to
Section 352, which shall include consideration of any corroboration
and remoteness in time, "domestic violence" has the further meaning
as set forth in Section 6211 of the Family Code, if the act occurred no
more than five years before the charged crime.
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court
determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of
justice.
(f) Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative
agencies regulating the conduct of health facilities licensed under
Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code is inadmissible under this
section.
Comparative Note.
Federal Rules. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 199474 ("Act") that Congress approved in 1994 creates three
exceptions to Rule 404(a)'s ban on the use of character evidence. 75
Rules 413-415 allow the use of character evidence in prosecutions in
74. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
75. Id.
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which the accused is charged with sexual assault 76 or child molesta-
tion 77 and in civil cases in which the victim seeks compensation for
having been sexually assaulted or molested. 78 The new Rules author-
ize the use of evidence of the defendant's commission of other sexual
assaults or molestations to prove any relevant matter, including the
defendant's predisposition to commit the offense charged.79
Rules 413 and 414 require the government to disclose the un-
charged misdeed evidence to the defendant, including statements of
witnesses or summaries of the testimony it anticipates offering, at least
fifteen days prior to the trial or at a later time as the court may allow
for good cause. 80 Rule 415, which applies to civil actions, imposes the
same disclosure requirements on the party seeking to offer the evi-
dence the Rule allows. 81
The Act required the Judicial Conference ("Conference") to pro-
vide Congress with a report containing the Conference's recommen-
dations on the new Rules. 82 In its report, the Conference concurred
with the views of the Advisory Committees on the Evidence Rules and
on the Criminal and Civil Rules that adopting the new Rules was un-
desirable.83 Of the more than forty judges, practicing lawyers, and aca-
demicians asked to review the new Rules, only the representatives of
the United States Department of Justice favored adopting them.8 4
Among the reasons the Conference cited for its opposition were: (1)
the lack of empirical evidence to support the proposition that evi-
dence of past acts is predictive of future acts; (2) the danger of con-
victing the accused on account of his or her "bad" character; (3) the
undue consumption of time and potential for confusion of issues that
could emanate from the mini-trials required to prove or disprove that
the defendant engaged in the uncharged misconduct; and (4) con-
cerns that the uncharged misconduct evidence would have to be re-
ceived if relevant.85 Despite this strong opposition, Congress did not
76. FED. R. EvID. 413.
77. Id. at 414.
78. Id. at 415.
79. See id. at 413(a), 414(a), 415(a).
80. See id. at 413(b), 414(b).
81. Id. at 415(b).
82. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 320935(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 2137, quoted in FED. R. EviD. 413 hist. n.
83. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 51-54 (1995).
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id.
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modify or reject the new Rules, and they went into effect in 1995 with
the passage of the Act.8 6
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have construed the Rules
as authorizing federal judges to employ Rule 403 to exclude propen-
sity evidence offered under Rules 413-415 whenever its probative
value on contested issues is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effects. 87 Rules 413-415 are silent on the applicability of Rule 403.
California. Code section 1108 is California's response to the con-
gressional enactment of Rules 413-415. Code section 1108 differs
from the Rules in three respects. First, under the California provision,
the bad character evidence is limited to prosecutions and is not admis-
sible in civil actions for damages.88 Second, the range of prosecutions
in which the evidence is admissible in California is broader than
under the Rules. Code section 1108 includes not only sexual assault
and child molestation prosecutions but also prosecutions for possess-
ing pornographic materials depicting minors, employing minors for
sexual depictions, and distributing obscene material to minors, irre-
spective of whether these materials have been transported in inter-
state commerce.89 Like Rules 413-414, Code section 1108 requires the
prosecution to notify the accused of its intention to offer the bad char-
acter evidence prior to the start of the trial.90
Third, unlike the Rules, Code section 1108 expressly empowers
trial judges to exclude the evidence of uncharged sexual misdeeds if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial ef-
fects.9 1 In assessing the probative value of the evidence, the judge
should consider the dissimilarities between the uncharged and
charged misdeeds, the remoteness of the uncharged misdeed, the
amount of time needed to receive evidence proving or disproving the
uncharged misdeed, and the probability that the evidence of the un-
charged misdeed might confuse the jurors.9 2 If the trial judge admits
the evidence of the uncharged sexual misdeeds, then under Califor-
86. § 320935(a), 108 Stat. at 2136-37.
87. Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1269 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d
658, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West Supp. 2007).
89. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(d)(1)(A) (indicating the code sections for the crimes de-
scribed in the text accompanying this footnote). Federal law punishes the receipt or distri-
bution of these kinds of material only if transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
90. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1108(b).
91. See id. § 1108(a).
92. See MENDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.14, at 71-72.
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nia case law the jurors must be told not to consider the evidence
against the accused unless they first find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the accused committed the misdeeds.9 3
If under Code section 1108 evidence of uncharged sexual mis-
deeds is received to prove the accused's propensity to commit the sex-
ual misdeed charged, the accused is entitled to disprove the trait with
good character evidence.9 4 Code section 1108 limits the prosecution
to offering evidence of specific instances of sexual misconduct in es-
tablishing the accused's propensity to commit the sexual misdeed
charged.9 5 But the defendant's right of rebuttal is not so limited.9
6
The defendant's greater rights stem from the fact that the rebuttal
evidence is governed by Code section 1100 which provides that when
character evidence is admissible, the pertinent trait may be proved by
evidence of reputation, opinion, or specific instances of conduct.
9 7
Code section 1108 is not the only recent exception to the rule
banning the use of character evidence to prove conduct. Code section
1109 allows prosecutors to offer evidence of an accused's acts of do-
mestic violence, elder or dependent-adult abuse, or child abuse as
proof of the accused's propensity to commit such violence or abuse if
offered in an action in which the accused is charged with an offense
involving domestic violence, elder or dependent-adult abuse, or child
abuse. 98 In the case of domestic abuse, the accused does not need to
be charged with domestic violence for the other acts of domestic vio-
lence to be admissible. The section is triggered if the offense charged
involves such acts. For example, forcibly raping a girlfriend or a
spouse can be viewed as a form of domestic violence. 99 Accordingly, a
charge of forcible rape can open the door to admitting evidence of
other acts of domestic violence even if the other acts do not involve
sexual misconduct.1 00 Moreover, the prosecution is not limited to of-
fering only acts of domestic violence with the victim of the offense
charged. In proving the accused's propensity to engage in acts of do-
93. Id. § 3.17, at 110.
94. People v. Callahan, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 855 (Ct. App. 1999).
95. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a).
96. Callahan, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
97. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1100 (West 1995).
98. Id. § 1109(a) (West Supp. 2007).
99. People v. Poplar, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 326 (Ct. App. 1999) (involving forcible
rape of the defendant's girlfriend); People v. Garcia, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 897 (Ct. App.
2001) (involving forcible rape of the defendant's spouse).
100. See Garcia, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897; see also Poplar, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
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mestic violence, the prosecution may call as witnesses other victims of
the accused's violence. 10 1
Like Code section 1108, Code section 1109 requires the prosecu-
tion to inform the accused prior to the trial of its intention to offer
the uncharged acts. 10 2 As in the case of Code section 1108, the judge
is empowered under Code section 1109 to exclude the uncharged acts
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its preju-
dicial effects.10 3 Evidence of uncharged acts occurring more than ten
years before the charged act is generally inadmissible unless the judge
determines that its admission is in the interests of justice. 10 4
Before the jurors may consider the other acts of domestic vio-
lence or abuse, they must first find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the accused committed those acts.' 0 5
There is no federal counterpart to Code section 1109.
1.03 Habit and Custom
RULE 406. HABIT; ROUTINE PRACTICE
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the pres-
ence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the per-
son or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with
the habit or routine practice.
§ 1105. Habit or custom to prove specific behavior
Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit or custom is admissi-
ble to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the
habit or custom.
Comparative Note. Evidence that is inadmissible as character evi-
dence may be admissible if offered as evidence of habit or custom. For
example, to prove that the victim had locked his car on the occasion
when the accused was found in the car, the victim was allowed to offer
evidence of his habit of locking the car's doors. 1° 6 Similarly, to prove
101. See Poplar, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(b).
103. Id. § 1109(a).
104. Id. § 1109(e).
105. See MENDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.17, at 110.
106. In re Charles G., 156 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1977).
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that California followed certain discretionary practices in approving a
particular roadway design, the state was allowed to offer evidence re-
garding its customs and practices in approving roadway designs. 10 7
Rule 406 and Code section 1105 provide that evidence of a habit may
be admitted to prove that on a specified occasion a person conducted
himself or herself in conformity with the habit.10 8 Both, moreover,
provide that evidence of custom or routine practice may likewise be
admitted to prove that on a given occasion an organization con-
formed its operations to the custom or routine practice. 10 9 Because
evidence of habit or custom is beyond the ban on the use of character
evidence to prove conduct, it is important for the parties and the
court to distinguish between inadmissible character evidence and ad-
missible evidence of habit and custom. The key can be found in the
definition of a habit. Both the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 406
and the Comment to Code section 1105 define a habit as a "regular
response to a repeated specific situation."' 10 This definition was taken
from Dean Charles McCormick's treatise on evidence. I1 Because hab-
its are regular responses to repeated situations, their execution does
not require much thought.' 2 They are more probative of conduct
than character because as semi-automatic, consistent responses to a
specific stimulus, they say much about a person's conduct when the
person encounters the stimulus."13 Moreover, receiving evidence of
custom or routine practice can be justified on the grounds of need.11 4
It would be unrealistic, for example, for a large business to prove
through witnesses with first hand knowledge that one customer out of
many was mailed a particular bill.'15 Human memory simply cannot
help.'16
There is no substantive difference between the federal and Cali-
fornia approaches to evidence of habit and custom or routine prac-
tice. California should retain its rule.
107. Alvarez v. State, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 728 (Ct. App. 1999).
108. FED. R. EVID. 406; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 (West 1995).
109. FED. R. EVID. 406; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 cmt.
110. FED. R. EvID. 406 advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 cmt.
111. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 195, at 574-75.
112. MPNDEZ, supra note 10, § 3.19, at 116.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 117.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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1.04 Subsequent Remedial Measures
RULE 407. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, mea-
sures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury
or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
§ 1151. Subsequent remedial conduct
When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precaution-
ary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event.
Comparative Note. Personal injury lawyers can appreciate the value
of presenting the fact finder with evidence of the steps the defendant
took to remedy the condition or instrumentality that harmed the
plaintiff. They know that the fact finder would consider such steps as
an admission by the defendant of wrongdoing, whether inadvertent or
otherwise. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs' bar, Rule 407 and Code
section 1151 ban the use of evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures when offered to prove negligence or other culpable conduct.' 1 7
The evidence is not excluded because it is irrelevant." 8 Rather, it
is excluded because of the belief that its use to prove negligence or
other culpable conduct would discourage defendants from making re-
pairs after an accident." 19
117. FED. R. EVID. 407; CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1995).
118. The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence takes the po-
sition that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is excluded also because it may be
irrelevant. "The conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is equally consistent
with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence." FED. R. EvID. 407 advi-
sory committee's note. The Committee concedes, however, that under "a liberal theory of
relevancy" evidence of remedial measures does operate as an admission. Id.
119. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 cmt.
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Code section 1151 does not apply to strict liability actions. In Ault
v. International Harvester Co., 120 the California Supreme Court held
that the term "culpable conduct" does not embrace strict liability.
1 21
In a strict liability action against a manufacturer, "negligence or culpa-
bility is not a necessary ingredient. The plaintiff may recover if he es-
tablishes that the product was defective, and he need not show that
the defendants breached a duty of due care."'
122
At one time, the federal circuits were split on whether the subse-
quent repair doctrine of Rule 407, as originally enacted, applied to
strict liability cases.1 2 3 However, the proper construction of Rule 407 is
no longer an issue. A 1997 amendment provides that evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove "a defect in a
product" or a "defect in a product's design."'12 4
The 1997 amendment also makes clear that Rule 407, like Code
section 1151, applies only to remedial measures undertaken after the
occurrence that produced the damages giving rise to the action.'
25
"Evidence of measures taken by the defendant prior to the 'event'
causing 'injury or harm' do not fall within the exclusionary scope of
Rule 407 even if they occurred after the manufacture or design of the
product."126
The sending of warning or recall notices to owners of products
may be viewed as a remedial measure. But consistent with Ault's hold-
ing that Code section 1151 does not apply in strict liability actions, 127
notices alerting consumers to take safety measures are admissible
against a manufacturer in a California strict liability action.' 2l Under
Rule 407, however, such notices may not be offered to prove a design
or manufacturing defect in federal court.' 29
Evidence of remedial measures may be admissible if relevant to
some issue other than the defendant's negligence or culpable con-
duct. As stated in Rule 407, evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures need not be excluded "when offered for another purpose, such
120. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
121. Id. at 1150-51.
122. Id. at 1150.
123. See FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note (1997 Amendment).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150-51.
128. Magnante v. Pettibone-Wood Mfg. Co., 228 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422-23 (Ct. App.
1986).
129. FED. R. EVID. 407.
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as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary mea-
sures, if controverted, or impeachment."' 130 The Code does not con-
tain an equivalent provision. No such provision is necessary, however,
since the evidence would not be within the prohibition of Code sec-
tion 1151.
Evidence of remedial measures undertaken by third parties inde-
pendently of the defendant is not barred by the subsequent repair
doctrine.1' 3 1 It is immaterial whether the evidence is offered to prove a
defective condition in a strict liability case, as in Ault, or to prove neg-
ligence or other culpable conduct.132 In the latter case, the policy of
encouraging repairs is not undermined as "liability is not sought
against the person taking the remedial action."1 33
1.05 Compromise
RULE 408. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE
(a) Prohibited uses.-Evidence of the following is not admissible
on behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of,
or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to
impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting
or offering or promising to accept-a valuable consideration in com-
promising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations re-
garding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the
negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exer-
cise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses.-This rule does not require exclusion if the
evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Ex-
amples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's bias or
prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an ef-
fort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
130. Id.
131. Magnante, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
132. Id. at 422-23.
133. Id. at 423 (quoting Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 238 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich. 1976)).
In Magnante, a boom which became disengaged from its base struck the plaintiff. Id. at 421.
To prove that the boom was defectively designed, the plaintiff was permitted to show the
repairs his employer undertook after the accident to prevent the boom from disengaging.
Id. at 421-22. See also TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir.
1994), involving repair of a defective fan undertaken by a third party, and cases cited
therein.
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§ 1152. Offer to compromise
(a) Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humani-
tarian motives, furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or
any other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will
sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss or
damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation
thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or dam-
age or any part of it.
(b) In the event that evidence of an offer to compromise is admit-
ted in an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or violation of subdivision (h) of Section 790.03 of the Insur-
ance Code, then at the request of the party against whom the evidence
is admitted, or at the request of the party who made the offer to com-
promise that was admitted, evidence relating to any other offer or
counteroffer to compromise the same or substantially the same
claimed loss or damage shall also be admissible for the same purpose
as the initial evidence regarding settlement. Other than as may be ad-
mitted in an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or violation of subdivision (h) of Section 790.03 of the Insur-
ance Code, evidence of settlement offers shall not be admitted in a
motion for a new trial, in any proceeding involving an additur or re-
mittitur, or on appeal.
(c) This section does not affect the admissibility of evidence of
any of the following:
(1) Partial satisfaction of an asserted claim or demand without
questioning its validity when such evidence is offered to prove the va-
lidity of the claim.
(2) A debtor's payment or promise to pay all or a part of his or
her preexisting debt when such evidence is offered to prove the crea-
tion of a new duty on his or her part or a revival of his or her preexist-
ing duty.
§ 1153.5. Offer for civil resolution of crimes against property
Evidence of an offer for civil resolution of a criminal matter pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
or admissions made in the course of or negotiations for the offer shall
not be admissible in any action.
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§ 1154. Offer to discount a claim
Evidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to
accept a sum of money or any other thing, act, or service in satisfac-
tion of a claim, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotia-
tion thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the claim or any
part of it.
Comparative Note. Life would be easier for plaintiffs and defend-
ants if they could show that their opponents had offered to settle their
claims. But to promote the public policy of compromising and settling
disputes, the Code and the Rules prohibit the use of settlement offers
to prove the validity or invalidity of a claim. 134 Accordingly, a plaintiff
may not prove the validity of his or her claim by evidence that the
defendant offered to settle the claim, and a defendant may not prove
the invalidity of the plaintiffs claim by evidence that the plaintiff was
prepared to accept a lower amount. To ensure a candid exchange of
views, the prohibition expressly applies to settlement conference state-
ments and conduct, and not just the offers themselves. 13 5
To invoke the protection afforded by the prohibition, the ob-
jecting party must show that the statement was made in an effort to
compromise an actual dispute over the validity of a claim or its
amount.1 36 Offers to pay undisputed claims as to validity or amount
are not protected. 137 As stated by Dean Charles McCormick, "[T]here
is no policy of encouraging compromises of undisputed claims. They
should be paid in full.' ' 38 His position is reflected in those provisions
of Code section 1152 which provide that the section does not affect
the admissibility of evidence of
(1) [p]artial satisfaction of an asserted claim or demand without
questioning its validity when such evidence is offered to prove the
validity of the claim [and] (2) [a] debtor's payment or promise to
pay all or a part of his or her preexisting debt when such evidence
is offered to prove the creation of a new duty on his or her part or
a revival of his or her preexisting duty.139
134. FED. R. EvID. 408; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154 (West 1995).
135. FED. R. EvD. 408; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154.
136. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a); C~A.. EVID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154. Both the California and
federal provisions refer to offers as the "compromise" of claims. See FED. R. EVID. 408; CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154.
137. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1152(c) (1), 1154.
138. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 266, at 466 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
139. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(c)(1)-(2).
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If the evidence of settlement is offered to prove not liability but
some other relevant proposition, then the evidence is no longer
within the prohibition of the rules. 40 For example, if a defendant set-
tles with one of several plaintiffs and then calls the dismissed plaintiff
as a witness, the remaining plaintiffs may elicit the fact of settlement
on cross-examination to show the witness's possible bias. 14
1
The protection afforded by Code section 1152 does not extend to
California criminal cases. In People v. Muniz,142 the accused sought to
exclude evidence that he had offered to pay for the victim's medical
expenses in a sex offense prosecution.143 The court upheld the admis-
sion of the evidence, holding that Code section 1152 is limited to civil
cases. 144 The court refused to construe "liability" as used in the section
to include criminal matters. 145
The same question has arisen in federal courts. Some hold that
Rule 408's protection does not extend to criminal cases. 146 A 2006
amendment to Rule 408 now allows the use of statements or conduct
made during compromise negotiations "when offered in a criminal
case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or
agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement au-
thority. ' 147 By way of justification, the Advisory Committee Note em-
phasizes that "[w]here an individual makes a statement in the
presence of government agents, its subsequent admission in a crimi-
nal case should not be unexpected. '" 148 Accordingly, where a defen-
dant in a civil proceeding brought by the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") makes damaging admissions in an effort to compromise the
claim, Rule 408 as amended would allow the government to offer
those admissions in a subsequent prosecution for tax fraud. The
judge, however, is still empowered to exclude the admissions under
Rule 403 if their probative value is substantially outweighed by their
140. See FED. R. EvD. 408(b); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1152(c), 1154.
141. See Granville v. Parsons, 66 Cal. Rptr. 149, 152-54 (Ct. App. 1968). Granville was a
pre-Code case, but the court made it clear that section 1152 would require the same ruling.
See id. at 153-54.
142. 262 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Ct. App. 1989).
143. Id. at 746.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Prewitt, 34 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
admissions of fault made while compromising a civil securities enforcement action were
admissible against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution for mail fraud).
147. FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (2).
148. Id. at advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
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prejudicial effects. 149 As an example of evidence that a judge may ex-
clude under Rule 403, the Advisory Committee cites the statements an
unrepresented individual makes in a civil enforcement proceeding.
15 0
As amended, Rule 408 purports to distinguish between evidence
of statements and conduct made during compromise negotiations
and evidence that the accused offered or agreed to settle the claim. 15'
Accordingly, in a tax evasion prosecution, the government may not
offer evidence that the accused offered to compromise the tax claim
as proof of its validity but may offer the accused's settlement state-
ment, "I concede that I owe the back taxes," as a party opponent ad-
mission. In the Advisory Committee's view, an offer or an acceptance
of a compromise, unlike a direct statement of liability, is not very pro-
bative of.the accused's guilt.152
Another Code provision, section 1153.5, applies to criminal as
well as civil cases.1 53 This section bans the use of an offer for a civil
resolution of a complaint alleging a crime against property if the offer
is made with the assistance of the prosecutor.154 Both the offer as well
as the admissions made in the course of the negotiations are pro-
tected from disclosure in any subsequent proceeding. 155
Rule 408 differs from Code sections 1152 and 1154 in two re-
spects. First, the Rule itself makes clear that exclusion is not required
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as "proving a
witness's bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion."1 5 6 This result is obtained in California by applying Code section
355, which provides that when evidence is inadmissible for one pur-
pose but admissible for another, the court may admit it for the proper
purpose with the appropriate limiting instruction. 157
Rule 408 does not include impeachment among the other per-
missible purposes for which settlement conference statements can be
149. Id. at 403.
150. Id. at 408 advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
151. Id. at 408.
152. Id. at advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
153. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1153.5 (West 1995).
154. Id. Section 1153.5 implements the policy of California Code of Civil Procedure 33,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 33 (West 2006), which vests prosecutors with the discretion to assist
in the civil resolution of crimes against property in lieu of filing a criminal complaint. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1153.5.
155. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1153.5.
156. FED. R. EVID. 408(b).
157. CAL. EvID. CODE § 355.
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offered. 158 Whether statements made in compromise negotiations
should be admitted as prior inconsistent statements to impeach a
party has been controversial. Opponents point out that the value of
impeaching a party through inconsistent statements made in compro-
mise negotiations is outweighed by the negative effect such impeach-
ment would have on the candor required for successful settlement
negotiations.1 59 As amended in 2006, Rule 408 adopts this view. 160 It
prohibits the use of statements made in settlement negotiations if of-
fered as a prior inconsistent statement or as evidence of
contradiction. 161
California decisions provide only indirect support for the pro-
posed federal amendment. No appellate court has approved the use
of settlement conference statements to impeach a party. Because of
the importance of the concerns involved, California should consider
explicitly excluding the use of settlement statements when offered as
prior inconsistent statements or as evidence of contradiction.
Second, prior to the 2006 amendment, Rule 408 was also explicit
in another important respect: exclusion was not required of "any evi-
dence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations.' 1 6 2 The 2006 amendment deleted
this language as superfluous.163 Accordingly, even after the amend-
ment, a party cannot immunize information that is germane to the
case by raising it in the settlement negotiations.I 64 Thus, if the defen-
dant admits at the settlement conference that his mechanic warned
him that his brakes needed to be replaced, the plaintiff would be pre-
cluded from offering the defendant's admission to prove the
mechanic's warning. The plaintiff, however, would be free to discover
the mechanic's statement and to call the mechanic to the stand to
repeat the warning he gave to the defendant. A plaintiff who sues in a
California court should also have access to this evidence, since neither
Code section 1152 nor Code section 1154 purports to immunize the
subject matter of evidence presented at the settlement conference.
The language deleted by the 2006 amendment to Rule 408 served
an important purpose. It alerted the parties and the court that evi-
158. See FED. R. EvID. 408.
159. Id. at advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
160. Id.
161. ld. at 408(a).
162. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Star. 1926, 1933 (current version at FED.
R. EVID. 408).
163. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note (2006 Amendment).
164. Id.
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dence disclosed at settlement negotiations is not immunized from dis-
covery and proof simply because it is disclosed in that setting. One
should not assume that all or most lawyers who do civil litigation and
judges who preside over civil trials are familiar with this principle. Cal-
ifornia should consider adding the deleted language to its rule. Such
an addition would not be unprecedented since the Code includes
such a provision in its chapter on mediation. 1
65
The Rules do not contain a rule on admissions made in the civil
resolution of complaints alleging crimes against property. Neither do
the Rules have a provision dealing with the admissibility of statements
made in the course of mediation. The Code, on the other hand, has a
number of provisions regarding the confidentiality of statements
made in mediations. 1 66
Recognizing the increasing role of mediation in resolving dis-
putes, the California Legislature added a chapter to the Code in 1997
that protects from disclosure information that is exchanged in the
course of mediation.' 6 7 Mediation is defined as "a process in which a
neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the dis-
putants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agree-
ment."'168 The chapter applies to all mediations except settlement
conferences in civil cases and those undertaken pursuant to the Fam-
ily Code. 169
Unless all of the participants otherwise agree,
1 70
No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a medi-
ation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclo-
sure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration,
administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal pro-
ceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to
be given. 1 7 1
Identical protection from disclosure is given to writings that are
prepared "for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a medi-
ation or a mediation consultation." 17 2 All communications, negotia-
165. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120(a) (West Supp. 2007).
166. See id. §§ 1115-1128.
167. See id.
168. Id. § 1115.
169. Id. § 1117. Special rules apply to family and custody conciliation proceedings. Set-
tlement conferences are conducted under special court rules. Id. at cmt.
170. Id. § 1122(a). The agreement may be oral or in writing. Id.
171. Id. § 1119(a).
172. Id. § 1119(b).
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tions, or settlement discussions by the participants are to remain
confidential. 173
Evidence that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery
outside the mediation or mediation consultation may not be immu-
nized from disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in the
mediation or mediation consultation.1 74 Moreover, even communica-
tions protected by the mediation privilege can be disclosed if all the
persons who participated in the mediation agree to do so in writing or
orally. 17 5 "Participants" include the parties, the mediator, and other
nonparties, such as accountants, spouses, and employees of the par-
ties, attending the mediation.' 76 Only matters disclosed during the
mediation are protected from disclosure.1 77 Matters disclosed after
the mediation ends are not entitled to protection.
178
The mediation provisions do not diminish in any way the protec-
tion afforded by Code sections 1152 and 1154 or other statutory provi-
sions. Thus, if a communication is not protected by the mediation
provisions but is within Code section 1152, it remains protected under
this section.
The Code chapter on mediations was added to encourage the use
of mediations to settle disputes. It should be retained.
1.06 Humanitarian Gestures
RULE 409. PAYMENT OF MEDICAL AND SIMILAR EXPENSES
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible
to prove liability for the injury.
§ 1160. Admissibility of expressions of sympathy or benevolence;
definitions
(a) The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures
expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the
pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and made
173. Id. § 1119(c).
174. Id. § 1120(a).
175. Id. § 1122(a). Oral agreements to disclose are valid only if they meet a number of
requirements. See id. § 1118. An agreement to disclose may be made at any time, not only
just before the mediation begins. See zd. § 1121 cmt.
176. Id. § 1122 cmt.
177. See id. § 1126.
178. See id. For a list of the ways in which a mediation can be terminated, see id. § 1125.
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to that person or to the family of that person shall be inadmissible as
evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action. A statement of
fault, however, which is part of, or in addition to, any of the above
shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this section.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Accident" means an occurrence resulting in injury or death
to one or more persons which is not the result of willful action by a
party.
(2) "Benevolent gestures" means actions which convey a sense of
compassion or commiseration emanating from humane impulses.
(3) "Family" means the spouse, parent, grandparent, stepmother,
stepfather, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister,
adopted children of parent, or spouse's parents of an injured party.
Comparative Note. The Rules and the Code protect the statements
and conduct of persons who offer or furnish humanitarian aid.179
Rule 409 provides that "[e]vidence of furnishing or offering or prom-
ising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury. s18 0 Though it
uses different language, Code section 1152(a) has the same effect.1 8 '
The purpose is to encourage humanitarian gestures by removing the
concern that they might be used as admissions. Neither Rule 409 nor
Code section 1152(a) requires the objecting party to show that the
humanitarian statements were made or that the conduct was under-
taken in an attempt to compromise a claim or its amount.
California has an additional provision. Recognizing that many
personal suits are prompted by anger at the defendant's failure to
apologize for the injury, the California Legislature in 2000 amended
the Code to reduce suits by encouraging defendants to apologize with-
out fear their apologies might be considered admissions.18 2 Code sec-
tion 1160 provides that:
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expres-
sing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the
pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and
made to that person or to the family of that person shall be inad-
missible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.' 8 3
179. FED. R. EvID. 409; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 1995).
180. FED. R. EVID. 409.
181. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a).
182. Id. § 1160 cmt. (West Supp. 2007).
183. Id. § 1160(a).
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Statements of fault, however, remain admissible even if part of pro-
tected statements, writings, and benevolent gestures.1I 4 Accordingly,
"I was using my cell phone and just didn't see you coming" would be
admissible, but not the preamble, "I'm sorry you were hurt."18 5
California should retain its benevolent gestures provision.
1.07 Pleas and Related Statements
RULE 410. INADMISSIBILITY OF PLEAS, PLEA DISCUSSIONS,
AND RELATED STATEMENTS
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the follow-
ing is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the
defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable
state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of
guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding
wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or
plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fair-
ness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal
proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by
the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of
counsel.
§ 1153. Offer to plead guilty or withdraw plea of guilty by criminal
defendant
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or of an offer to
plead guilty to the crime charged or to any other crime, made by the
defendant in a criminal action is inadmissible in any action or in any
proceeding of any nature, including proceedings before agencies,
commissions, boards, and tribunals.
184. Id.
185. Id. § 1160 cmt.
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Comparative Note. Prosecutors would have an easier time ob-
taining convictions if they could offer the jury evidence that prior to
the trial the accused offered to plead guilty to the offense charged or
to some lesser offense. Though such evidence would constitute an ad-
mission, Rule 410 and Code section 1153 exclude such offers in order
to encourage plea bargains.' 8 6 Both provisions also bar the use as ad-
missions of evidence of a guilty plea that is later withdrawn.18 7 There
would be scant value in allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea,
enter a not guilty plea, and proceed to trial if the prosecution could
use the withdrawn guilty plea as an admission.
A key question is whether the protection extends to the state-
ments made in connection with the offer to plead guilty or the with-
drawn plea. If only the words constituting an offer were protected,
then knowledgeable defendants would refrain from engaging in plea
bargaining since admissions made in the course of negotiations would
be admissible in the event no bargain was struck. Rule 410 answers
this question by extending the protection to "any statement made in
the course of plea discussions" as well as the offer to plead guilty.'88
Code section 1153 is silent on this point but has been construed as
extending to the statements made in the course of plea negotiations
as well as to the offers to plead guilty.189 Given the importance of the
question, California should consider adopting the language of Rule
410 rather than relying on judicial construction.
Another important question is whether the prosecution may use
the accused's plea negotiations statements for impeachment in the
event that the plea negotiations fail and the accused testifies inconsis-
tently with his negotiation statements. Despite Code section 1153's
broad command that evidence of an offer to plead guilty is "inadmissi-
ble in any action," People v. Crow'90 holds that Code section 1153 does
not prohibit the prosecution from using the statements for impeach-
ment purposes. 91 Only their use as admissions is barred. 19 2
Rule 410 provides the accused greater protection. It bars the use
of plea negotiations statements against the accused without distin-
186. See, e.g., FED. R. EVlD. 410 advisory committee's note; see also CAL. EVIL. CODE
§ 1153 (West 1995).
187. FED. R. EVID. 410; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1153.
188. FED. R. EVID. 410.
189. People v. Tanner, 119 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410-11 (Ct. App. 1975).
190. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct. App. 1994).
191. Id. at 631.
192. See id.
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guishing between admissions and impeachment, a construction the
United States Supreme Court has recognized.1 93 The Court, however,
has held that Rule 410 does not prohibit the prosecution, as part of
the plea bargaining process, from requiring the accused to relinquish
the right not to be impeached by statements made during the plea
negotiations. 194
Whether the accused should be impeached by statements made
in plea discussions presents difficult choices between promoting plea
bargains on the one hand and discouraging criminal defendants from
testifying inconsistently with their prior statements on the other. Rule
410 strikes the balance in favor of plea bargaining by prohibiting the
use of plea discussion statements for impeachment unless the accused
relinquishes the Rule's protection as a condition to entering into plea
negotiations.19 5 Code section 1153 appears to be as broad as Rule 410.
It provides that evidence "of an offer to plead guilty to the crime
charged or to any other crime, made by the defendant in a criminal
action is inadmissible in any action or in any proceeding of any na-
ture. '' 19 6 Despite the distinction drawn by Crow, Code section 1153
plainly does not distinguish between impeachment and admissions.
Code section 1153 does not define the participants in plea negoti-
ations. Offers and related statements made to prosecuting attorneys
qualify for protection, but so may statements to police officers if made
in the course of bona fide plea negotiations. 19 7 Rule 410 is less protec-
tive. It protects only those statements made by the accused or his law-
yer to "an attorney for the prosecuting authority."'198
The California provision does not expressly limit bona fide plea
discussions to discussions with attorneys employed by the county dis-
trict attorney or the California Attorney General.199 Police officers
193. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200 n.2 (1995).
194. See id. at 210.
195. See FED. R. EVID. 410.
196. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1153 (West 1995).
197. Compare People v. Posten, 166 Cal. Rptr. 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
the accused's admissions to transporting police officers were admissible at his trial because
there was no evidence that the accused made the admissions in the course of bona fide
plea negotiations), with People v. Magana, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1993) (exclud-
ing transporting police officers from the participants in the plea bargaining process).
198. FED. R. EVIn. 410. The original rule was not limited to the attorney for the prose-
cuting authority and was construed to include other law enforcement officials, including
postal inspectors who had custody of the accused. See id. at advisory committee's note
(1979 Amendment) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (6) and advisory committee's note (1979
Amendment)).
199. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1153.
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and other law enforcement personnel sometimes participate in plea
negotiations. Accordingly, this aspect of the California provision
should be retained. Any uncertainty about who qualifies as a plea par-
ticipant for the prosecution can be resolved by an amendment to
Code section 1153.200
Guilty pleas, unlike offers to plead guilty and guilty pleas later
withdrawn, are not protected from disclosure. Thus, if a defendant
pleads guilty to a speeding violation, that plea can then be offered
against the defendant as an admission by any plaintiff injured by the
defendant's driving. Because that prospect may discourage criminal
defendants from negotiating a plea to charges stemming from occur-
rences that injure others, California Penal Code section 1016(3)201
permits a plea of nolo contendere by providing that:
[P] lea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry
it makes as to the voluntariness of, and factual basis for, the plea
may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil
suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal
prosecution is based.20 2
In 1982, however, this protection was limited to "cases other than
those punishable as felonies." 203 The limitation is designed to "assist
the efforts of victims of crime to obtain compensation for their inju-
ries from the criminals who inflicted those injuries." 20 4
Rule 410, on the other hand, continues the traditional approach.
It prohibits the use of a plea of nolo contendere in any civil or crimi-
nal proceeding regardless of the grade of the offense. 20 5 The Penal
Code's exclusion of felonies from the protection accorded to nolo
contendere pleas in civil actions reflects California policy and should
be retained.
200. The application of some Code provisions hinges on a person's perceptions of the
role occupied by others. For example, a client who reasonably believes that the person with
whom he or she is consulting is a lawyer allows the client to claim the attorney-client privi-
lege, even if the other person is not a lawyer. See id. § 950. Similarly, a patient who reasona-
bly believes that the person with whom he or she is consulting is a physician or
psychotherapist allows the patient to claim the physician-patient or the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, even if the other person is not a physician or psychotherapist. See id.
§§ 990, 1010 (West 1995 & Supp. 2007). A similar approach could be taken with respect to
section 1153. An amendment could provide that plea participants could include anyone
the accused reasonably believes is authorized to engage in bona fide plea negotiations.
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 2007).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Act of July 7, 1982, ch. 390, § 1, 1982 Cal. Stat. 1725, quoted in CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1016 hist. n.
205. FED. R. EVID. 410.
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1.08 Liability Insurance
RULE 411. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or
otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose,
such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of
a witness.
§ 1155. Liability insurance
Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by
another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability
for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other
wrongdoing.
Comparative Note. Rule 411 and Code section 1155 prohibit the
use of evidence of insurance as proof of negligence or other wrongdo-
ing.20 6 Two concerns account for the prohibition. One is that the evi-
dence might be irrelevant because possessing liability insurance
simply does not make one more or less careful on a given occasion.20 7
The other is the risk that the fact finder might be tempted to return a
verdict against an insured defendant, regardless of the strength or
weakness of the evidence of fault, because of the belief that the defen-
dant will not have to pay the judgment from his own resources. 20
If possessing liability insurance is not probative of fault, then not
possessing such insurance is likewise not probative of the absence of
fault.209 Rule 411 proceeds on this assumption. It provides that
"[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or
otherwise wrongfully."210 Code section 1155 does not contain a similar
provision. Accordingly, in California courts, the party opposing evi-
dence of the lack of liability insurance must object on irrelevance
grounds. Consideration should be given to conforming the California
rule to the federal rule.
206. Id. at 411; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1995).
207. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 138, § 201, at 357.
208. See id.
209. See FED. R. EVID. 411.
210. Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
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Evidence of liability insurance may be admissible if offered for a
purpose other than to prove negligence or other wrongdoing. In the
words of Rule 411, exclusion is not required when the evidence is "of-
fered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or
control, or bias or prejudice of a witness." 211 Even when offered for
such a purpose, the trial judge may nonetheless exclude the evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that the
jury might misuse the evidence.21 2 If the evidence is received, upon
request, the opposing party is entitled to an instruction limiting the
jury's consideration of the evidence to the purpose for which it was
received.213
1.09 Other Limitations on Relevant Evidence
§ 1156. Records of medical or dental study of in-hospital staff
committee
(a) In-hospital medical or medical-dental staff committees of a
licensed hospital may engage in research and medical or dental study
for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, and may make
findings and recommendations relating to such purpose. Except as
provided in subdivision (b), the written records of interviews, reports,
statements, or memoranda of such in-hospital medical or medical-
dental staff committees relating to such medical or dental studies are
subject to Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010 of Part 4) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (relating to discovery proceedings) but, sub-
ject to subdivisions (c) and (d), shall not be admitted as evidence in
any action or before any administrative body, agency, or person.
(b) The disclosure, with or without the consent of the patient, of
information concerning him to such in-hospital medical or medical-
dental staff committee does not make unprivileged any information
that would otherwise be privileged under Section 994 or 1014; but,
notwithstanding Sections 994 and 1014, such information is subject to
discovery under subdivision (a) except that the identity of any patient
may not be discovered under subdivision (a) unless the patient con-
sents to such disclosure.
(c) This section does not affect the admissibility in evidence of
the original medical or dental records of any patient.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
213. See FED. R. EVID. 105; CAL. EvID. CODE § 355.
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(d) This section does not exclude evidence which is relevant evi-
dence in a criminal action.
§ 1156.1. Records of medical or psychiatric studies of quality
assurance committees
(a) A committee established in compliance with Sections 4070
and 5624 of the Welfare and Institutions Code may engage in re-
search and medical or psychiatric study for the purpose of reducing
morbidity or mortality, and may make findings and recommendations
to the county and state relating to such purpose. Except as provided
in subdivision (b), the written records of interviews, reports, state-
ments, or memoranda of such committees relating to such medical or
psychiatric studies are subject to Title 4 (commencing with Section
2016.010 of Part 4) of the Code of Civil Procedure but, subject to
subdivisions (c) and (d), shall not be admitted as evidence in any ac-
tion or before any administrative body, agency, or person.
(b) The disclosure, with or without the consent of the patient, of
information concerning him or her to such committee does not make
unprivileged any information that would otherwise be privileged
under Section 994 or 1014. However, notwithstanding Sections 994
and 1014, such information is subject to discovery under subdivision
(a) except that the identity of any patient may not be discovered
under subdivision (a) unless the patient consents to such disclosure.
(c) This section does not affect the admissibility in evidence of
the original medical or psychiatric records of any patient.
(d) This section does not exclude evidence which is relevant evi-
dence in a criminal action.
§ 1157. Proceedings and records of organized committees having
responsibility of evaluation and improvement of quality of
care; exceptions
(a) Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized com-
mittees of medical, medical-dental, podiatric, registered dietitian, psy-
chological, marriage and family therapist, licensed clinical social
worker, or veterinary staffs in hospitals, or of a peer review body, as
defined in Section 805 of the Business and Professions Code, having
the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of
care rendered in the hospital, or for that peer review body, or medical
or dental review or dental hygienist review or chiropractic review or
podiatric review or registered dietitian review or veterinary review or
acupuncturist review committees of local medical, dental, dental hygi-
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enist, podiatric, dietetic, veterinary, acupuncture, or chiropractic soci-
eties, marriage and family therapist, licensed clinical social worker, or
psychological review committees of state or local marriage and family
therapist, state or local licensed clinical social worker, or state or local
psychological associations or societies having the responsibility of eval-
uation and improvement of the quality of care, shall be subject to
discovery.
(b) Except as hereinafter provided, no person in attendance at a
meeting of any of those committees shall be required to testify as to
what transpired at that meeting.
(c) The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony does not
apply to the statements made by any person in attendance at a meet-
ing of any of those committees who is a party to an action or proceed-
ing the subject matter of which was reviewed at that meeting, or to any
person requesting hospital staff privileges, or in any action against an
insurance carrier alleging bad faith by the carrier in refusing to accept
a settlement offer within the policy limits.
(d) The prohibitions in this section do not apply to medical, den-
tal, dental hygienist, podiatric, dietetic, psychological, marriage and
family therapist, licensed clinical social worker, veterinary, acupunc-
ture, or chiropractic society committees that exceed 10 percent of the
membership of the society, nor to any of those committees if any per-
son serves upon the committee when his or her own conduct or prac-
tice is being reviewed.
(e) The amendments made to this section by Chapter 1081 of the
Statutes of 1983, or at the 1985 portion of the 1985-86 Regular Ses-
sion of the Legislature, or at the 1990 portion of the 1989-90 Regular
Session of the Legislature, or at the 2000 portion of the 1999-2000
Regular Session of the Legislature, do not exclude the discovery or
use of relevant evidence in a criminal action.
§ 1157.6. Proceedings and records of quality assurance committees
for county health facilities
Neither the proceedings nor the records of a committee estab-
lished in compliance with Sections 4070 and 5624 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code having the responsibility of evaluation and improve-
ment of the quality of mental health care rendered in county oper-
ated and contracted mental health facilities shall be subject to
discovery. Except as provided in this section, no person in attendance
at a meeting of any such committee shall be required to testify as to
what transpired thereat. The prohibition relating to discovery or testi-
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mony shall not apply to the statements made by any person in attend-
ance at such a meeting who is a party to an action or proceeding the
subject matter of which was reviewed at such meeting, or to any per-
son requesting facility staff privileges.
§ 1159. Animal experimentation in product liability actions
(a) No evidence pertaining to live animal experimentation, in-
cluding, but not limited to, injury, impact, or crash experimentation,
shall be admissible in any product liability action involving a motor
vehicle or vehicles.
(b) This section shall apply to cases for which a trial has not actu-
ally commenced, as described in paragraph (6) of subdivision (a) of
Section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on January 1, 1993.
Comparative Note. In addition to the limitations that have been
noted, the Code contains a number of other limitations on the use of
relevant evidence that are omitted in the Rules.
Code section 1156 promotes research to reduce morbidity and
mortality by in-hospital medical or medical-dental staff committees of
licensed hospitals by limiting the admissibility of the written records of
the interviews, reports, statements, and memoranda connected with
the research. 214
Code section 1156.1 promotes research to reduce morbidity and
mortality by committees established to undertake medical or psychiat-
ric study by limiting the admissibility of the written records of the in-
terviews, reports, statements, and memoranda connected with the
research. 215
Code section 1157 applies to the proceedings and records of
committees charged with evaluating and improving the quality of care
rendered by a variety of health professionals, including medical doc-
tors, dentists, and therapists. 216 In addition to exempting the proceed-
ings and records from discovery,217 subject to certain exceptions,
section 1157 provides that "no person in attendance at a meeting of
any of those committees shall be required to testify as to what tran-
spired at that meeting. ' 21
8
214. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1156 (West 1995 & Supp. 2007).
215. Id. § 1156.1.
216. Id. § 1157(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 1157(b).
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Code section 1157.6 extends Code section 1157's prohibitions on
discovery and testimony to the proceedings and records of commit-
tees charged with evaluating and improving the quality of mental
health rendered in county-operated and -contracted mental health
facilities. 219
Code section 1157.7 extends Code section 1157's prohibitions on
discovery and testimony to the proceedings and records of any com-
mittee established by a local governmental agency to monitor, evalu-
ate, and report on the necessity, quality, and level of specialty care
provided by a general acute care hospital which has been designated
or recognized by the local governmental agency as qualified to render
specialty care services, including trauma care. 220
Code section 1159 prohibits the use of evidence pertaining to live
animal experimentation in any product liability action involving a mo-
tor vehicle.221
All of these Code provisions address special concerns and should
be retained.
1.10 Recommendations
The breadth of topics covered in this Article makes generaliza-
tions difficult. Nonetheless, when it comes to relevance and its limits,
the conceptual overlap between the Rules and the Code is striking.
Both define relevance in almost identical terms and vest judges with
discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by similar enumerated concerns.
In addition, the Rules and the Code have similar provisions for
excluding categories of relevant evidence in order to advance impor-
tant policies: subsequent remedial measures are excluded to en-
courage the making of repairs; offers to plead guilty and related
statements are banned to promote plea bargaining; pleas of nolo con-
tendere are excluded to encourage defendants to settle criminal
cases; humanitarian gestures are promoted by eliminating the risk
that they might be used as admissions; and the settlement of civil
claims is encouraged by banning the use of settlement conference
statements to prove the validity or invalidity of the claims.
The Rules and the Code take similar, though not identical, ap-
proaches to the admissibility of character evidence. When character is
219. Id. § 1157.6.
220. Id. § 1157.7.
221. Id. § 1159.
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not an element of the cause of action, both posit a general rule disfa-
voring the use of character evidence to prove that on a given occasion
a person conformed his or her conduct to a particular character trait.
Both build on the common law exceptions that allow criminal defend-
ants to offer evidence of their character to counter evidence of guilt
and of their victims' character to disprove or diminish their culpability
for the crime charged. In addition, the Rules and the Code have come
to recognize new exceptions which disfavor the accused. In sexual as-
sault cases, for example, federal and California prosecutors may now
offer evidence of uncharged sexual misdeeds as proof of the accused's
propensity to commit the sexual misdeed charged.
The Rules and the Code seek to protect the victims of sexual as-
saults through rape shield laws that limit the kind of evidence the ac-
cused may offer to prove consent or to discredit the victim as a
witness. In addition, both permit the use of evidence of habit and rou-
tine practices because the evidence does not raise the concerns associ-
ated with character evidence.
But despite the overlap, some significant differences between the
Rules and the Code remain. In some instances, one set of rules will
contain provisions the other set does not. The Code provisions on
mediation are a good example. Because of the importance of media-
tion as a conflict resolution tool, the Code devotes an entire chapter
to rules promoting mediation. The Rules are silent on mediation. In
other instances, the approach of one set of rules is superior to the
other set's approach. The Rules, for example, expressly prohibit the
use of a statement made in settlement negotiations if offered as a
prior inconsistent statement or as evidence of contradiction. The
Code says nothing about this important matter.
The purpose of this Article is to help identify those provisions of
the Code that should be retained and those that should be changed
when the Rules or the Uniform Rules offer a better approach. Below is
a summary of the major recommendations reached in the article.
(1) Rule 401 makes clearer than Code section 210 the burden the
proponent must discharge when confronted by an irrelevance objec-
tion. The proponent need only convince the judge that the proffered
evidence makes the existence of any consequential fact more or less
probable than the fact would be without the evidence. Though both
provisions impose the same burden on the proponent of the evi-
dence, the language of Rule 401 is superior in this respect. Accord-
ingly, California should consider adopting Rule 401's language on
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how a judge should measure the probative value of the proffered
evidence.
(2) Neither the Code nor the Rules establishes a preference be-
tween direct and circumstantial evidence. In section 410, however, the
Code at least defines direct evidence. The Rules do not have an analo-
gous provision. California should retain section 410.
(3) Under Rule 404(a) (2), the government may, in a homicide
prosecution, offer evidence of the victim's trait of peacefulness even if
the accused did not first offer evidence of the victim's predisposition
to engage in unprovoked attacks. So long as the accused offers evi-
dence that the victim was the first aggressor on the occasion in ques-
tion, the prosecution may offer evidence of the victim's trait of
peacefulness in the form of opinion and reputation evidence. The
Rule applies, however, even if other eyewitnesses testify to the fatal
attack.
The Code does not contain a similar provision. If one is enacted,
it should be limited to those homicide prosecutions in which the vic-
tim is the deceased and there are no surviving eyewitnesses other than
the accused.
(4) Rule 404(b) and Code section 1101(b) provide similar,
though not identical, non-exclusive lists of permissible propositions
that may be proved by seemingly inadmissible character evidence.
Rule 404(b) differs from the Code in that it requires the prosecution
in a criminal case to provide notice in advance of trial of its intention
to offer evidence under the Rule. Pretrial notice is included to reduce
surprise and promote early resolution of the issue of admissibility.
The Uniform Rules go further. Uniform Rule 404 provides for
pretrial notice in all cases, not just prosecutions. In addition, if the
evidence is offered against the accused, Uniform Rule 404(c)(2) re-
quires the court to conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of
the evidence and to exclude the evidence unless the proponent con-
vinces the judge by clear and convincing evidence that the misdeed
attributed to the accused was committed and that its probative value
on contested issues outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Because
evidence offered under Rule 404(b) and Code section 1101(b) can be
especially prejudicial to the accused, California should consider
adopting the pretrial notice of the federal provision as well as the ad-
ditional safeguards of the Uniform Rules.
(5) Code section 1104 bans the use of evidence of a trait of a
person's character with respect to care or skill to prove the quality of
his or her conduct on a specified occasion. The Rules do not have a
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counterpart. The California provision is a specific application of the
general prohibition on the use of character evidence. Its value is put-
ting the parties and the court on notice that the prohibition applies to
traits of care and skill as well, especially in personal injury cases. Ac-
cordingly, Code section 1104 should be retained.
(6) Both the federal and California rape shield laws have been
amended extensively. Their amendments reflect the difficulties each
jurisdiction has faced in achieving an appropriate balance between
the rights of sexual assault victims and those of the accused. California
should retain its provisions.
(7) There is no substantive difference between the federal and
California approaches to evidence of habit and custom or routine
practice. Because California practitioners and judges are familiar with
the Code provision, California should retain its rule.
(8) With regard to subsequent repairs, California should retain
its own rule. As construed in Ault, it embodies the important policy
that the state's subsequent repair doctrine should not apply in strict
liability actions.
(9) Rule 408 does not include impeachment among the permissi-
ble purposes for which settlement conference statements may be of-
fered. Whether statements made in compromise negotiations should
be admitted as prior inconsistent statements to impeach a party has
been controversial. Opponents point out that the value of impeaching
a party through inconsistent statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is outweighed by the negative effect such impeachment would
have on the candor required for successful settlement negotiations. As
amended in 2006, Rule 408 adopts this view. It prohibits the use of a
statement made in settlement negotiations if offered as a prior incon-
sistent statement or as evidence of contradiction. The Code is silent
on this point. Because of the importance of the concerns involved,
California should consider explicitly excluding the use of settlement
statements when offered as prior inconsistent statements or as evi-
dence of contradiction.
(10) Prior to the 2006 amendment, Rule 408 was also explicit in
another important respect: exclusion was not required of any evi-
dence otherwise discoverable merely because it was presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. The 2006 amendment deleted
this provision as unnecessary. Neither Code section 1152 nor Code
section 1154 purports to immunize the subject matter of evidence
presented at the settlement conference. The language deleted by the
2006 amendment to Rule 408 served an important purpose. It alerted
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the parties and the court that evidence disclosed at settlement negoti-
ations is not immunized from discovery and proof simply because it is
disclosed in that setting. California should consider adding the de-
leted language to its rule. Such an addition would not be unprece-
dented. The Code includes such a provision in its chapter on
mediation.
(11) The Code chapter on mediation was added to encourage
the use of mediation to settle disputes. It should be retained.
(12) California has an additional provision relating to the policy
of excluding evidence of humanitarian gestures. Recognizing that
many personal suits are prompted by anger at the defendant's failure
to apologize for the injury, the California Legislature in 2000
amended Code section 1160 to reduce suits by encouraging defend-
ants to apologize without fear their apologies might be considered
admissions. California should retain its benevolent gestures provision.
(13) An important question is whether the protection afforded to
an offer to plead guilty or a withdrawn guilty plea extends also to the
statements made in connection with the offer or the withdrawn plea.
Rule 410 answers this question in the affirmative by extending the
protection to any statement made in the course of plea discussions as
well as the offer to plead guilty. Code section 1153 is silent on this
point but has been construed as extending to the statements made in
the course of plea negotiations as well as to the offers to plead guilty.
Given the importance of the question, California should consider
adopting the language of Rule 410 rather than relying on judicial
construction.
(14) Whether the accused should be impeached by statements
made in plea discussions presents difficult choices between promoting
plea bargains, on the one hand, and discouraging criminal defend-
ants from testifying inconsistently with their prior statements, on the
other. Rule 410 strikes the balance in favor of plea bargaining by
prohibiting the use of plea discussion statements for impeachment
unless the accused relinquishes the Rule's protection as a condition to
entering into plea negotiations. Code section 1153 appears to be as
broad as Rule 410. Despite the distinction drawn by Crow, Code sec-
tion 1153 plainly does not distinguish between impeachment and ad-
missions. Consideration should be given to amending the Code to
overturn Crow.
(15) Code section 1153 does not define the participants in plea
negotiations. Offers and related statements made to prosecuting attor-
neys qualify for protection, but it is less clear whether police officers
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and others who participate in bona fide plea negotiations on behalf of
the prosecution qualify as plea participants. Code section 1153 does
not expressly limit bona fide plea discussions to discussions with attor-
neys employed by the county district attorney or the California Attor-
ney General. Police officers and other law enforcement personnel
sometimes participate in plea negotiations. To eliminate uncertainty
about who else qualifies as a plea participant for the prosecution, Cali-
fornia should consider amending Code section 1153.
(16) Rule 410, following the traditional approach, prohibits the
use of a plea of nolo contendere in any civil or criminal proceeding
regardless of the grade of the offense. Section 1016(3) of the Califor-
nia Penal Code excludes felonies from the protection afforded to
nolo contendere pleas in civil actions. Section 1016(3) reflects a con-
sidered California policy and should be retained.
(17) If possessing liability insurance is not probative of fault, then
not possessing such insurance is likewise not probative of care. Rule
411 proceeds on this assumption. It provides that evidence that a per-
son was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the
issue of whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
Code section 1155 does not contain a similar provision. Accordingly,
in California courts, the party opposing evidence of the lack of liability
insurance must object on irrelevance grounds. Consideration should
be given to conforming the California rule to the federal rule.
(18) Code section 1153.5 bans the use of an offer for a civil reso-
lution of a complaint alleging a crime against property if the offer is
made with the assistance of the prosecutor. Both the offer as well as
the admissions made in the course of the negotiations are protected
from disclosure in any subsequent proceeding. The Rules do not have
an equivalent provision. Section 1153.5 should be retained.
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